Actually everything is working Iranian style. There is a counter move for every move… As of the moment I began writing this article the latest news from Iran is: Hamaney met with Musavi; displays of protest have been prohibited, but the religious guide announced that he wanted the results of the elections to be investigated. In other words, authorities from the highest echelons of Iran’s system have taken charge of the situation. In spite of this, there is news that thousands of protesters have begun rushing towards the Meydan-ı Azadi. Freeway traffic is jammed (but this is a normal scene for Tehran traffic). News has come that Musavi and Kerrubi, who are concerned that events can develop in an unwanted way, have set out to calm down demonstrators.

It is hard to decide from here whether or not there have been irregularities in the elections. Is the real strength of the opposition on the streets being exaggerated, or are those who want to see a people’s revolution in the demonstrations mistaken? Or is all that is happening a revolution of “some of the people”? It is apparent from the commentaries that events are being viewed through the eyes of the Western press. So many things are being mixed with the commentaries seen from this perspective that it has become impossible to analyze election results without filtering out these things. For example, taking events back prior to the revolution, one analyst writing from America made this observation: “everyone expected a revolution against the Shah, but they were not expecting an Islamic Revolution. The mollas took over at the last moment.”  What results can be had from election commentary made according to this historical (!) conclusion?

Since it is necessary to begin with the history of the revolution, those who followed the revolution know very well that there were various groups in the revolution that materialized under the leadership of Humeyni. Just as no group or faction had the potential to garner the support of the partisans to the Islamic Revolution that Humeyni represented, i.e. the Iranian people, neither did they have the power to make a revolution. Except for the masses behind Humeyni, all groups were just individual factions. Humeyni realized one of the greatest revolutions of the century because in spite of his mass support, he also got different political groups to support him.

Another point that needs to be underlined is that whatever Humeyni promised before the revolution, he accomplished it afterwards. Beforehand he said, “I am going to establish an Islamic Republic,” and the foundations of the revolution were initiated in this direction. In other words, he was not two-faced before the people. The character of the revolution and its implementation are a different subject for debate.

I think it will be helpful for me to make a comparison with Turkey by means of the election. Approximately thirty years after the Republic was founded and the Kemalist reforms had passed through some painful periods, an important transformation occurred. Making this transformation internally, the system consolidated the Kemalist reforms with the 1950 elections. Regardless of how much the CHP elite who support the status quo call this a “counter-revolution,” in reality by renewing itself, the system included the rejected silent majority and allowed for its own continuity. By means of this transformation, by making important strides on the road to becoming a mass ideology, Kemalism maintained its continuity.

The Iranian elections have been held exactly on the 30th anniversary of the revolution.

The question I asked in my last article can now be understood better: Can the Iranian revolution realize an internal transformation?

Of course, the conditions are not exactly the same as those in Turkey were. However, like every revolution, the Iranian Revolution is faced with the question of whether or not it can make a transformation and sustain its mass support. The basic difference between the reforms in Turkey and the revolution in Iran in respect to the “actors and participation” is this: Turkish reforms were accomplished by the hands of the elite, and the multi-party period initiated by the Democrat Party allowed for relative mass support for the elitist reforms.

The situation in Iran is just the opposite in this respect: Realized through the participation of the masses, the revolution is faced with the test of whether it can hold on to its popular support or, in other words, whether or not it can renew itself…

It is a fact that Ahmedinejad took the support of the status quo and entered the race. Another fact that those who wanted to read Iran from the boulevards of Tehran did not see is his constantly keeping a close contact with the broad rural masses. In addition, another fact worth mentioning is “everyone being Iranian” in the face of external threat, regardless of their camp. I think Ahmedinejad used this psychology of the people very well. Even if he does not fulfill most of his promises, it is obvious that his goal to become a nuclear power which has become a part of national identity and his perception of foreign threat are not factors to be underestimated.

A matter that supporters of reform were not able to explain is this: In the eyes of urban, educated groups especially, the world outside of Iran is a paradise! Without understanding this perception, it does not seem possible that the system can stop the opposition.

In addition to all these, regardless of who is in power, the essential matter that the Iranian revolution has to handle is to overcome the corruption made in the name of religion. Without resolving this situation which has become a moral problem, degeneration can not be prevented – not to mention the matter of their contribution to Islamic civilization as a new world order.

�lgili Yaz�larEnglish, Siyaset