When street protests against the Baath regime in Syria evolved into an armed struggle, the hope that Assad would step down soon prevailed. Formation of the Free Syrian Army and sporadical clashes with the Syrian army forces followed. At that time one of the spokespersons of the Syrian opposition organized an information meeting summing up the course of events. Representatives of the circles supporting Islamic movements in Syria or at least wishing the Baath regime to step down participated. The opposition spokesperson gave very realisitc and rational explanations of the course of events, and analyzed the current stage, strengths and weaknesses of the opposition. It seemed a very reasonable summary to me. However, I remember quite well the reaction of those in Istanbul who supported the Syrian opposition to the spokesperson’s words like “international balance, strategic calculation, military and political situation”: such issues as military force and strategic balance should not stand in the way of the Syrians’ righteous battle, they should fight that sacred war till the end. I should say that compared to this romantic heroic approach of the friends of Syria in Turkey, the opposition spokesperson looked much more cool-headed.

How is it possible to win a war fighting against one of the most rigid military regimes in the Middle East not taking into consideration the significance of the military forces balance and the importance of international calculation?

When yesterday a statement of the Syrian opposition leader Mouaz al-Khatib expressing his personal opinion appeared on the news, I rememebered the meeting I mentioned above. The international news agencies wrote that according to an unconfirmed source Mouaz al-Khatib said he was ready to negotiate with the Assad regime if the latter fulfilled certain conditions. The statement, which was claimed to represent al-Khatib’s personal opinion, is an important sign of a breaking point on the line where all negotiations were previously refused. It makes even more sense that this satement followed the one that the Russian Foreign Minister made a few days ago. It is worth reminding that the statement of the Russian Foreign Minister was understood as “Russia was never supporting the Assad regime and the regime is collapsing day by day”. While the opposition moves towards negotiations, Russia has also reminded Assad that the credit given to him was not unlimited and made it clear that it could stop supporting the regime if Russia’s strategic interests require it.

The most striking was the critism of “those who advice the opposition to fight rather than negotiate”. I could not help remembering the highl heroic talks of those who just a year ago were not able to suport Syria with anything more than a little humanitarian aid but had quite an influence on public opinion when they recommended that “strategic balance and physical force would not hinder this righteous suite”. While even in Istanbul such advices are given, who knows what was said in the Arabic countries, where the fetva was broadcasted on television and the Syrians awere agitated and provoked to stand gainst Assad in all possible ways, which demonstrates the gravity of the whole situation.

If we go back to the very beginning, I consider it useful to refresh our memory by reminding you of certain matters we have alreay talked about.

It was impossible for the winds of the Arab spring not to have an effect on Syria as a country where the opposiiton has a very high potential.

It was not unknown how the Baath regime would react to a revolt in Syria. It was very clear that a regime that had had such a criminal record as Hama massacre would not go throwing flowers around.

Everybody who has an idea of the “game of states” knows that when a peaceful protest turns into an armed struggle a human tragedy follows and the struggle then automatically becomes dependent on the outside resources.

The opposition was expecting quick success, encouraged by the Arab states of the Persian Gulf, Saudis and Turkey, but didn’t they realize that the Assad regime had much more effective fire power at their disposal, or where they told that “arms do not matter much on this way”?

When the armed struggle started, the regime, experienced in suppressing revolts did not hesitate to take murderous measures, but the opposition also damaged its image with the actions of “uncontrolled” groups coming form the outside.

Buying arms is not the same as buying a sack of potatoes. Every political power that provides military and monetary aid balances it with its own strategic calculations, or does not do it at all.

It is understood that the opposition, encouraged by the US and regional states’ anti-Assad rethorics and hoping for their intervention, did not calculate that neither the US nor Europe had intentions or were capable of such an intervention. Remembering that the West was just watching 250 thousand people massacred in Bosnia, in the very centre of Europe, we cannot yet guess what bloodbath ratio is supposed to prevent the violence in the Middle East.

The worst thing is that the nation states (like Turkey and Iran) that have different strategic interests in the region have demonstrated the aptitude to form sectarian cliques around the Syrian issue, which might trigger the sectoral and ethnical failure line. Even if this solves the Syrian problem somehow, it would leave a deep crack that would take long time to be mended.

This list can go on. The result so far is more than 60 thousand casualties, hundreds of thousands of refugees, a ruined country, a civil war, and it is unknown when it will finish and who will be the winner. To be right does not mean atrophying conscience, neither does it mean negating the intellect.

Ýlgili YazýlarEnglish