After the events in Iraq and Syria, it’s hard to anticipate if the political landscapes will change or not. However, but  what is certain is that the century old equation will no longer be valid. After this moment, the question is who is going to set the equation. It’s worth to brainstorm brainstorming as to what the price of re-establishment by the colonialist statuesque will be, given that it was once built to at the cost of the an empire’s destruction of an empire after the world warWorld War I.

What is unspoken is how the values, which bear the existential meaning of the region, has have been overlooked among the assertive projects, predictions. We have to renew the cliché that attempts to explain everything on the basis ofbased on the “western hegemony games” and mostlyeven though it is is accurate in most cases .

The western/orientalist approach, which is accustomed to read reading the question of the Middle East modernization, is quite effective in deciding how much its strategic vision has changed. For example, For example, once again we must remember how this mental background, which read the the Middle East through the modernization problem, has sufficiently tried to make justifications in order to support the despotic regimes.

The regimes which have undertaken social engineering tasks in the international systemregimes, which have undertaken social engineering tasks in the international system, are collapsing one by one. For example, Saddam was bragging about the Baath regime to be the only secular regime in the region. Moreover, he relied on this feature as his absolute guarantee for his authority and that he was unable to read the developments. And finally, he was gone. Now the whole region is paying for that  pricethat price .  What was the mission?  The Baath dictatorship undertook the role for transforming the society with a rigid modernist and secular state ideology. The Syrian Baath regime also ran the same function.  Whether it was their inter-state agreement or an under-covered one, the secular structure of their states was guaranteeing their authorities to a certain extent.  To what extent and level this secularism mission granted an authority grant to these dictatorships  woulddictatorships would only occur with contra-movements.

As a result, the only man who was alienated from his own society could not manage to dissolve the value judgments of the single party authorities, their belongings and deep tradition. In many fields, it was only the authority and elites who were socialized. Conversely speaking, since the alternative defiant movements fed on a more genuine social medium, the anti secularist dynamics were strengthened. Even if though not everyone individual on the social level did not participated to in the political opposition, they advocated its values against secularism. They resisted not to becomebecoming a secularist. They struggled to blend this phenomenon with their own values to the extent that modernity spread. Just as it applies to our case, they tried to limit the decaying affect of it in order not to become integrated to into the global capitalism.

What could have not been realized by the two Baath ideologies, both the one during Iraq in the post-Saddam period and the post-internal war period in the Syria of AsadAssad, now is carried out with their antithetical political competitors. Even though it’s the US whichUS, which has been occupying the region since September 11, 2001 and had shed the blood, its perception operation and the highlights in the name of Islam or its discourse pushed the society into the hands of secularism.

For example, let’s think about the slaughtered Shia, Yezidis, millions of Kurdish Muslims who sought shelter in Turkey because of a hate discourse in the name of Islam. Let’s think about the long term consequences of the victims or the masses that the armed ISIS ISIL’s violence slaughtered. Organizations came out which implement the transformation with blood and in the name of religion which the Saddam dictatorship, who was bragging about being under the guarantee of the secular regime or the Syrian Baath, could not succeed so. The main difference is that the most defiant of the dictatorships were mostly Islamist structures. In this case, those who take on the rescuer role against this organization, which came out in the name of Islam, are usually the secular organizations and discourses. From this perspective, one must read the policy that PKK applied in the southern east region of Turkey by which it forcibly digested its competitors and was socialized as a violence organization. One must question what is the political leadership that the Syrian Muslim Kurds’ political leadership are bound with and against what policies exactly and in what way it pushes prompting Kurds altogether to the secular organizations in the long term and  which even the dictators couldn’t have not succeed thatin the long term .

The practice of this violent structure ISILISIS  is not simply confined to Kurds or in the broad sense with the Iraqi victims who went under its trauma. Their practice is obviously going to give an upper hand for the global system and will affect the whole region and Turkey. The outcome of hate and blood involved discourse are is not going to be simply its political consequences. The adherents will cut off from the links that tie them up to the civilization and values. In time, they will be estranged and finally led will lead them into an existential storm. The masses, which secular leaders manipulated this time, are likely to be dragged into secularism becausesecularism, because of the implementations whichimplementations, which are done in the name of Islam.

Just as how this affected Turkey, which by changing its route from Jacobin secularism into conservative secularism, it will also flame the Islamophobic fears of the west. Because, particularly because of their fear, the west arewest is particularly motivated to make up some facilitating justifications in order to set up new regulations against Muslims.

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