The partition of Iraq in de facto terms began with the American invasion. This situation was realized through the Kurdish structure in North. It was supported by the Sunni-Shiite distinction in the middle and southern region. The mutual revenges with unidentified purposes and anonymous reasons were committed and this deepened the sectarian base partition through the bloodshed.

The Mosul oriented ISIS movement turned into an anger blowup of the Sunni Arabs against the Baghdad ruling. Groups including some Baathist commanders along with the Naqshibandi army and ISIS on the front turned into a military power. This anger blowup is a sectarian one and it forms a wide range of Islamic worldview from Wahhabi tones into Salafism. This worldview’s endurance and compatibility with the traditional Iraq society is another issue. Its effect to last in the region is open to discussion.

During the WW1, the British politics hypocritically merged with French pragmatism and succeeded in provoking Sharif Hussein bin Ali and his sons to engage a freedom war against Ottomans.

As a result, His clandestine agreement with British Sir Mark Sykes and French Fraqmcois George-Picot set in after the war. Thus, the promised great Arab state to Sharif Hussein simply fizzled out. After that, the contemporaneous Middle East map was almost shaped back then.

Now today’s discussion topic is that the artificial boundaries lasting a century are now being re-drawn. Since the boss of the new world order is unidentified, there are no clear ideas as to how in such a chaotic situation, it wants to set a balance. The certain thing is that the map has been worn out a lot.

Until now, we have touched on the topics that everyone attempts to make deep analyses. However there is some aspect of the Sykes Picot, that is, its relationship with a new insight and structure which has not been talked much. It arose as a military power and became the topic because of its struggle methods in certain regions of Asia and Africa.

We must accurately read the effects of the theological dimensions of this clandestine agreement due to its politically shaping nature of the Ottoman legacy. In other words, we must read its political-theological effects accurately.

As attested in British Foreign Ministry records, there is a huge space devoted to the discussions regarding Sharif Hussein and his supporters in important centers like Damascus. For example, there are clear reports what the Friday prayer sermons in the Ummayyad mosque were about: that a descent of Quraish, that is Sharif Hussein, must be replaced with the Ottoman caliph. Having said that, we are not sure if Sharif Hussein was promised to possess the position of a caliphate as well as a great Arab country. However, we know for sure that in the post Ottoman period, he found himself at least eligible to be a spiritual leader in the Islamic world.

In this process, Sharif Hussein and his sons only procured a torn apart Arab territory instead of a state. However, the most important aspect of it is that the Hijaz district was abandoned to the hands of the most marginal and extreme group in the Islamic world. Even so, this was encouraged.

Even though the Hijaz region or Mecca and Medina rebelled against Ottomans, the fact that it was going to be ruled by an allegedly prophetic family descendent, Sharif Hussein as a Sunni leader would have a spiritual weight in the Islamic world. Rather than the issues regarding Sharif Hussain’s personality or his treason because of his British cooperation, the most important matter is in what project the most significant, sacred territories of the Islamic world were submitted to the Saudi tribe.

We must remember that the domination of Wahhabism which is completely a strange idea to every kind of understanding in the Islamic world led to a certain result: it is the confinement of the political and spiritual representation of Islam to the Saudi Arabian territory. No Saudi administration will have a ‘natural leadership in the Islamic world’ because of having the priority for ruling the sacred places and therefore it will always have a problem of legitimacy.

The withdrawal of the Ottomans from the political arena, the question of its religious and political representation legacy was as important as the reconstruction of the political geography. In this divided geography and the bereft Islamic world from an authority/Caliph, the west solved the problem by seating an illegitimate tribe to that position for the spiritual representation.

After that, this altogether culturally and historically strange mentality to Islamic world was going to be supported by the oil income. Today it is clearer to see what kind of a premature birth the propagation and representation project of this mentality is.

The motive today behind giving priority to groundless, artificial mentalities, that actually sabotage and imprison the rising Islamic conscience and the reaction to the hegemonic control in the modern age, is a post modern version of a century old Sykes Picot project.

The modern political design of the Middle East region as a British French joint product had also a theological content. Therefore, these new movements staging in the Middle East are the postmodern versions of such a theological design.

Ýlgili YazýlarEnglish